The point is that Loughborough, once it existed, had to do something. It was never going to maintain the status quo, or adopt a passive, non-prescriptive approach. Perhaps its greatest discovery has been that the game has a mystery that cannot be unravalled by throwing something like Loughborough at it. Some kid with a tapeball and an alleyway for a wicket will come up with a method that you can’t map, precisely because it has never existed before.
— The Old Batsman

This cuts to a much deeper problem in coaching. Science or instinct?

Does top down, planned and centralised coaching produce better players than tapeball in an alleyway? I am not sure it's an either/or and I know throwing out blame or attacking hard-working coaches is not the answer.

Science dominated the conversation for a long time. Loughborough was established as a response to Australia’s National Academy. The system from down under coincided with one of the most successful cricket teams of all time. No wonder England copied it. 

So did South Africa. So did India, the epitome of “jumpers for goalposts” player development. Despite recent arguments, there’s some evidence of top-down success. 

There's also plenty of scientists and coaches who will tell you that a model based on centralised planning is a terrible idea. Players develop best, they argue, when they are left to solve their own issues and deal with their own problems. There was a time the best way to find a fast bowler was to whistle for one down a Yorkshire coal mine. 

Right now a lot of people are saying how obvious it is that Australia won the Ashes because they had extra pace. The result has made this conclusion inevitable. But what if England had done something unexpected? The world of politics shows that nothing is inevitable. Trump was never going to be President. Brexit was never really going to happen. Until it happened.

Loughborough style planning can’t handle this. It can only look at what went before and try to emulate better. When it fails to produce 90mph bowlers for England we say it hasn’t done the job. If it had rolled out a few nasty pacemen we would call it a success. What we don’t question is whether 90mph bowlers are the answer.

Maybe pace is the answer. Maybe a central Academy can never find one because England can’t produce those players since the country stopped coal mining. The world has changed. Controlled science is fighting a losing battle.

Maybe instead of trying to copy better, England look to copy worse and come up with their own answer. Maybe there is a creative solution out there in England. The next step forward, the next switch hitter, the next mystery bowler. Loughborough will never unearth such a player because they are building from history not exploring the future.

It's no surprise that the countries with the least formal structures produces the wildest players: Pakistan and Sri Lanka with the West Indies in third. They are coming up with their own way.

The inconsistency of these countries shows that creative instinct is not the total answer of course. Neither is highly managed science. I think we need a little of both. Let the bird fly free and offer as much financial and high tech support as we can.

At my level - club and school - I am grappling with the balance too. If a kid I coach comes to me with a unique style, do I try to coach more "efficiency"? Perhaps. What is more likely is I will not see that kid enough to have an impact. Even the guys I coach most I see twice a week at best. Most I see far, far less. Besides, their aim is to play and have fun, not have the most efficient bowling action or put on 10mph. Context rules.

At every level of coaching, we are all doing our best to have a positive impact. Yet, no one coach can make a huge difference. Not even a system has total control because we can never fully control every aspect of a players culture, environment and upbringing.

Perhaps instead of trying to find blame, we work harder and smarter to find what works at the edges and admit to ourselves that there is plenty out of our control.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

One of the biggest challenges for cricket coaches is not the "how to" coach stuff, but the part where people enjoy the sessions. We want it to be less broccoli and more ice cream. Here's a vlog I did about my experiences.

Let me know what you think.

Put smiles on faces at your cricket coaching sessions!

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe
Nets without nets: A customised game to develop outdoor cricket batting skills. 

Nets without nets: A customised game to develop outdoor cricket batting skills. 

One of the challenges for me as a coach is to find creative ways to use indoor practice to help players reach outdoor cricket goals. Here’s a game we played with a group of Under 16 cricketers I hoped would do just that. I hope you can find a practical use for something similar. 

I wanted the players to “just play” with minimal coach input to encourage self-discovery (one of the key principles of the constraints-led approach I am building into my coaching). However, I didn’t want the players to have a traditional game of indoor cricket as the goal was to improve strike rotation in outdoor cricket. Instead we set up a game with five a side, 15 minutes per innings, with the following way to score points: 

Batting team points: 

  • 1 = Rotate the strike.
  • 3 = Lose no wickets for 5 “rotations” .
  • 4 = Hit the ball through target cones. 

Bowling team points: 

  • 1 = Batsman hits the ball into the wall without it bouncing.
  • 2 = Batsman is caught off the wall.
  • 3 = Batsman is caught, bowled, stumped or assisted run out.
  • 4 = Batsman is run out with a direct hit. 

The team with the most points after both innings wins the game.  

To keep the game moving we rotated the batsman around when a run was scored. The non-striker became the umpire while the umpire switched with one of the two waiting batsmen.  

The game was tight up until the penultimate ball, which also - hopefully - gave the players the feeling of performaing when something is on the result. 

From my point of view the game played out as hoped, with players working out tactics, making mistakes and enjoying the situational nature of the game. Some players wanted another round instead of moving to nets.

One player felt there were not enough balls faced. Although I disagree, he is the type of player who wants a lot of volume in his sessions. I need to do a better job of making the outcomes clear alongside making sure the “volume” guys get a bit of pure time on task. For me, not the most efficient use of time but for him an important way to build confidence. I am not sure he is right, but the only way he will learn for sure is by experiencing different training types.

Some  may also argue that there was no isolated technical work with all the focus on outcomes. I am currently highly convinced by the argument that there is no need to isolated batting technique outside of decision making. Action always follows a decision. So, for me, this was a technical session too in that players had to develop a technical method to perform in the match. I have not always though this, having been brought up on the ideal of isolated drills, so this is a new experiment. However, I never really had much luck trying to force a set technique on a player in isolation. Perhaps that is just poor coaching from me, or perhaps it’s because technique is more about outcome effectiveness than movement perfection.

What are your thoughts on using this type of game? Useful and practical or otherwise? 


AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

Despite the overwhelming weight of evidence, this argument is not going away

It could be that modern coaching has moved too far away from the orthodoxies, as if the methods honed over decades of play, passed down in MCC manuals, don’t have a place in the modern game. There is, after all, a lot of talk about encouraging players to express themselves and play their natural way. But when five batsmen with such obvious flaws fail in such a short space of time, that looks less like a coincidence, and more like a pattern.
— Andy Bull

Look, I get the temptation to go back to the good old days when everyone was working towards a technique that was perfect. It’s the warm safety blanket of nostalgia. Simpler times when deep and ancient wisdom was passed down through The MCC Coaching Manual.

The problem is, this time never existed. 

When, throughout the rich history of cricket, has one master technique dominated the game? Not today, where coaches encourage players to develop their own solution. Not in the 70s, 80s, 90s or 00s when West Indians and Australians controlled international cricket with a variety of methods and techniques. Not in the 30s and 40s when Bradman set still unbeaten records with a technique that is still considered unorthodox. Not in Victorian cricket where Ranji invented a new shot called The Leg Glance and was seriously considered a cheat in many quarters for scoring off his pads in such a blatant way.

The MCC produced a manual in the 50s to help coaches and teachers have an easy reference guide. It was written by Harry Altham, an English Army Major who was educated privately. He was a fine coach by all accounts, but certainly did not carry the wisdom of the ages when writing it. It was written from one context: English Post-Colonial, Gentleman, Mid-century. It might or might not have been the only method in that context, but the evidence shows clearly it is wrong in most cases.

In fact, this was recognised by the MCC when the MCC Masterclass book - based on varied advice from different quarters - superseded this work in the 90s. There has not been an MCC manual since. Over 60 years since it's first incarnation and over 20 years since the last, we still cling to the idea that the MCC had all the answers in 1952. 

It's just not true.

My hope is soon we can recognise technique not as a series of dogmatic rules to be applied to perfection as defined by one Englishman in the 1950s, but as it is: wholly dependent on the body, mind, upbringing and culture of each player. That's harder to coach and not as nostalgic, but it's closer to the truth.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

This is a post about bowling speed. I wanted to be clear because there has been a lot of cross-talk about fast bowling recently. This is my effort to simplify speed for the confused coach.

Why are you confused? Because it’s confusing! There’s a lot of people talking in a lot of ways.

Steffan Jones is doing crazy innovation between S&C and technical correction with school age bowlers and sharing his ideas as he goes. I think he would admit it’s pretty complex stuff!

Meanwhile, the Grandmaster of Pace, Ian Pont, has other ideas. His methods are slightly different and very much grounded in technique through drilling core positions.

Then there is the ECB. Coaching courses have long abandoned the idea of technique first. They barely touch on S&C. They focus on game-based learning and maximum fun over drills, toys and methods.

Each approach is different. There is some crossover but there are also disagreements.

It is confusing.

What if you just want to know how to coach some pace?

Here’s my effort to simplify and tell you what I find works with the players I work with on pace. It’s not set in stone. It’s not the ultimate secrets of speed. but it might give you a head start.

Commitment beats everything

By far the number one way to be a fast bowler is to commit to being a fast bowler.

Sounds simple, but 90% of the bowlers I coach don’t commit to speed. They may be committed to bowling and bowl a lot. They might be naturally nippy. They might get bounce, swing and seam movement.

Whoever they are, they do not commit to fast bowling.

Anyone can increase speed - yes, without losing accuracy before you raise an eyebrow - but pace doesn’t come from committing to bowling in nets and games. That’s only one small piece of the puzzle.

No. For real speed without comprise you need to focus on it more than just bowling and hoping. Do that first and the rest is implementation details.

Four tent pegs are best

Ian Pont came up with the four tent pegs model of coaching speed years ago and it’s marvellous in its simplicity. Study it.

Of course, understanding the best positions for pace is one thing, drilling to get it into muscle memory is quite another. That’s why it only works when you commit.

Throw medicine balls

With technical work going on, you can use medicine balls to help players generate more power from the same frame.

Med balls are great because they are cheap, portable, usable by all ages and bridge the gap between pure strength exercises and bowling a ball.

There’s a lot of science behind it but for the coach all you really need to do is pick a 1-2kg ball that bounces and a couple of drills from the internet. Don’t complicate it, just chuck that ball about!

Bowl OU balls

The next step on the path from S&C to bowling is “overweight underweight” balls. Basically, heavy and light cricket balls. They are between 250g and 100g where a standard ball is 156g. So it’s not like there is a huge difference but it works.

The science with these balls is less established. It’s shown to work in baseball and in athletics. In cricket, I see results with bowlers putting on up to 5mph in one session. Anecdotal but convincing.

They are hard to get hold of in the UK but worth the investment in an order from Somerset Sports. They are the only place I know that stock them.

Again, play about with using them. They are best suited to low volume (perhaps 15-30 balls in a session) and in conjunction with a willing bowler who wants to use them regularly.

Yes, we are back to commitment again!

Manage load

There’s a lot of chat about how much bowlers should bowl. While it’s true that bowling is the best way to get strong to bowl, it’s also the best way to get injured. It’s tough to be a really fast bowler if you are knackered from a lot of bowling.

We all have to strike a balance.

Chances are you won’t be able to manage the number of overs of the bowlers you coach. If they are talented they will be playing in a number of teams. Even those who only play under one coach will rarely be bothered about “workload management”. They just want to play cricket.

Your best bet is to create self-awareness that bowling too much will slow them down eventually. It might be injury or fatigue but pace is fastest when they are fresh, strong and firing. Then do your bit: be mindful of not asking your bowlers to toil away in nets for two hours, three times a week.

Keep it simple

For me, bowling fast is a deep and exciting area of the game. You can delve as far as you want but if you want to keep it simple then you can do that too.

Have fun with it. Build technique with tent pegs, build strong bowlers with medicine balls and OU weighted balls and keep an eye on your workload. From under 10 to senior pros, this is the simplest way to go.

If you want more ideas for improving fast bowlers, contact me for a coach development session.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe
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Here's another game I made up to make a fun session for some under 15 players. I reckon it could work with most ages too.

In the game, the batsman gets to choose two "safe" zones. In this game we spilt the net into four; behind and in front, off side and on side. The batsman faces 24 balls.

Points are scored by hitting the ball with a full swing of the bat:

  • 0 points: Miss the ball
  • 0 points: ball defended, pushed or tapped.
  • 0 points: ball hit on the ground into unsafe zone.
  • 1 point: Wide bowled
  • 1 point: Ball struck into the safe zone in the air.
  • 2 points: Ball struck into the safe zone along the ground (and I really mean it must bounce before hitting the net!)

Obviously you can play with the points system to encourage different tactical and technical outcomes. This one was about trying to wack the ball into safe space.

The tactical wrinkle was the Power play.

The bowlers can call a six ball power play anytime during each batsman's innings. When the power play is on, the batsman has to remove one safe zone, meaning there is only one to hit into. The same points apply.

Be warned, this can be chaotic, especially with kids. I encourage them to find safe tactics to buck the rules and ways to play the "beat the system" as much as possible. Sometimes they go a bit far and I have to reign it in for safety or sense (like bowling deliberate wides). Mainly, it's just great fun and very competitive. 

You will no doubt want to tweak it for your needs, but give it a go!

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

SPOILER ALERT: It's not a coach, a mentor, a guru or someone who played first-class cricket.

Scanning through social media, listening to podcasts, watching videos. These are all great things to do for coaches and players. I've don it for years. The only thing I have really learned during this time is that no one knows it all.

A lot of people claim to know it all. Perhaps not directly, but certainly in their confident claims about themselves and criticisms of others. The subtext is not "here are some ideas I have tried and seem to work" and more like "I have discovered the secrets, everyone else is wrong".

I get why this happens. You have to market yourself. You have to stand out. You have to pander to your own ego (and everyone has one unless they are a clinical psychopath). Social media especially favours this approach.

Even those coaches who talk about evidence-based approaches and avoid self-congratulation don't say this enough:

Nobody knows anything for sure.

Nothing is 100% effective.

We all have our pet ideas. We all have drills and games we like and think work: Then someone comes along who it doesn't work for. You have to be very self-aware to remind yourself that it's not the player at fault, it's more likely drill or method isn't right for that person.

I make that mistake all the time!

I'm constantly reminding myself that each individual player is the only person who can work out what is effective for them. And they are as flawed as we all are in our thinking too. So, we work together to work out what works. We make a lot of mistakes. We feel frustrations when we lose opportunities but we just keep going.


Coaching is a science to some extent, but it's also an art. That means it's open to interpretation and everyone has a right to an opinion whether we like it or not. When you know that, you realise no coach has the answers (despite what they might imply). It's just not very easy to market on Instagram.

And you know what?

That's OK. 


AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

At Christmas, most people relax about their cricket. So it's the perfect time to get ahead for those who really want to improve their game.

If you're a player keen to boost your game, I am available in Glasgow throughout the winter period for coaching.

If you are further afield, still contact me and we can talk about my online coaching options such as training plans and mentoring.

Contact me for cricket coaching here.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

I read a tweet recently saying a famous coach was not good enough because the team were doing badly. I disagreed.

Even at the highest level, it's impossible to judge a coach purely on results because there are so many other factors at play: form, talent, confidence, conditions and opposition. You can play to your maximum potential, you can be as well-coached as possible and still lose the match.

I think the measure of a good coach is different. It's down to having the trust of the players. You have a good relationships. They believe you. They feel safe with you. You build their confidence with honesty. You fit into and help mould the character of the team. They want you with them.

These are not as easy to measure as results or as easy to see as technical changes, but they are a fairer reflection of what the coach can do. A coach can't control players like they are a computer game. They can sow seeds, create a safe environment and hope they grow.

At the lower levels, we can measure this more easily. Do kids keep coming to cricket sessions you put on week after week, year after year? If they do, you can feel successful regardless of the results of your team's matches, or the technical perfection of your players (most kids don't care much about these things anyway).

The result is part of the process, not the end goal.

What do you think?


AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

I've tried lots of different ways of feedback, and one of the most powerful ways I found is the feedback loop style shown above.

If I ask a bowler to bowl at a cone, they will consider it for a moment, then try to hit the cone. If they fail, they try again. More than likely after making a slight adjustment. The feedback is instant and easy to see.

I can see this working. Bowlers tend to get more accurate when bowling at a cone, with no other intervention.

The same is true for asking batsmen in nets to play the ball through a certain area.

I realise this is anecdotal, but research agrees. The controversial "10,000 hour rule" is a debated rule, but the research does show that instant, measurable feedback develops skill in most people.

Whatever your style of coaching, for me, communication is at it's best when you and the player can test-review-adjust and loop around again.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

While I am sure this is not original, here's a drill we came up with this week to help batsmen experiment and adapt while also tracking performance.

Feel free to adapt it to your needs. here is what we did:

  • Batsman faces 80 balls fed from coach with sidearm: 40 spin, 40 seam
  • The goal is to score as many points as possible in each quadrant.
  • Q1: Rotate the strike against spin (measured by cones as target areas).
  • Q2: Rotate the strike against seam.
  • Q3: Score boundaries against spin (measured batsman's judgement of how well the ball was hit).
  • Q4: Score boundaries against seam.
  • Keep track of score and review at the end.

For the batsman in this session, we also said that he had to call and run on every ball rotated.

We also defined where counted as a boundary (straight and midwicket) to give him some focus on scoring areas.

The batter and I decided to build flexibility and adaptability into the game in two ways:

  1. I varied the pace, line and length and amount of movement of the feed (and we didn't count any wides I accidentally bowled).
  2. The batter could set any target area for rotation and boundaries but was restricted to just two areas.

The reason for this is because we didn't want the drill to become too predictable or easy. If the player found a way to nail a boundary every time, I would mix up the feed or he could change the target area.

The other reason is to give the player space to adapt his game by setting his own taget areas. This chap, for example, is very strong on the reverse sweep and switch hit. This drill gives him room to experiment with playing the shots to different types of bowling and seeing the outcome as a number.

This, of course, means the end of session review is very important. What the player learned about game is more important than what I wanted them to discover. It's playing, but in a slightly more formal way.

Give it a go, it seemed to engage this player at least!

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe
...all you can do, like a farmer, is to create the conditions under which they will begin to flourish.
— Sir Ken Robinson

We don't show corn the proper technique to grow. We plant it. We feed and water it. We get rid of the weeds that choke. We let time and nature do the rest.

I have realised that cricket is the same. 

Give players the space and environment and let them grow.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

There’s a few changes coming up here, and while I can’t talk about anything yet I am keen to hear from you if you like my stuff, coach or play cricket. 


Please email me or get me on twitter for a proper badger chat about cricket and a couple of questions about what you like to see to help your coaching or playing. 


If you do reach out, thanks for your time. I will make it useful! 



AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

One of the easiest ways to turn off enthusiasm is to use unhelpful language.  

This occurred to me during the ECBCA Conference. There was a lot of practical stuff, but there was also tonnes of theory delivered quickly and often out of context. If I struggled to keep up with talk of “talent journeys” and the like, players will too.

In a conference context, this was not an error. But what would be an error would be taking the complex language and directly using it with the players we coach. I’m constantly checking myself to make sure that I don’t tip into words that are unclear with players.

Here are a few that I need to be careful around:

  • Constraint
  • Outcome
  • Pathway
  • Mindset
  • Pressure

All these are useful words in the right context of course. But I am a professional communicator so I need to build a language that can be understood to develop players, not turn them off through confusion or worse, deliver a different message from intended.

 ”Pressure” is my favourite example because I use it all the time but really it’s unhelpful. Pressure is a feeling generated from the inside. We can manage that so it doesn’t change performance.

By shouting to a kid “10 to win from the last six balls, no pressure!” I am pushing the player to think pressure is caused by something external like tight cricket situations.

What I am trying to do now is not use the word pressure at all. I prefer “critical moment”. Which still makes sense to most people. Then I can build in questioning like “what do you do differently in critical moments to stay in control?”, or “How can you control how you feel?”. It creates a space to learn the difference between external pressure and internal pressure and deal with it.  

I’m still learning this art but I am fascinated by it. 

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

I was talking with a coach today about the style and structure of sessions and kept coming back to a net session I tried this week that worked well despite my lack of planning.

I was with a small group of 12-15 year olds. They are club level kids and some of them are challenging to work with. It's my long term mission to engage them fully.

So, with that in mind, I went into their session without a plan other than to ask them "what do you want to work on".

This might have backfired spectacularly, but in reality they outperformed my expectations and took us through a session that was fun, engaging and nothing to do with what I thought it would be!

 Here's how it went.

Me: "So, what do you think we need to work on to be better by summer?"

Kids: "er. how about teamwork?"

Me: "Wow. OK! So how do we work on that when we only have nets to work in?

Kids: "um... *pause* running between the wickets?"

Me: "sounds fun! How do we make it a game?"

They then proceeded, to come up with a game where you had to run when you hit the ball in certain areas.

I added a bonus incentive, saying that if they called and ran as if it were in a game (yes and no, walking not running) I would do 20 press ups. But only if they whole team did it the whole session.

They were motivated, working hard and trying to make it a realistic outcome based game. All from a couple of questions and some constraints from me, then letting them get on with it.

They didnt quite make me do the press ups, but they almost did. I bet they will try even harder next time!

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

Fielding was improved for West in 2017 mainly with the introduction of three very good out fielders and a full time wicketkeeper into the side. This was as targeted, but we did make some chances to fielding measurement and preparation that are worth discussing in detail.

Here's what we found.

Fielding Targets

The targets for 2017 were:

  • Improve percentage of catches taken from 57%.
  • Hit the stumps more than 25% of attempts.
  • Make fewer than five ground fielding mistakes.

These are based on last year's performance. And tracked every game, as per last year.

We also introduced a new standard called "Fielding Impact" (FI). This is a way of working out roughly how many runs the team lost and saved through fielding. We had no metrics for this, so it was a season of working out what was acceptable. More on that later.

Catches and chances

Catching was improved vastly on last season with 70% of chances held: 74 balls went to hand and West clung on to 52 of them.

This broke down into 31 chances in close (slips, close catchers, wicketkeeper, and caught and bowled), 35 chances in the ring and 8 chances on the boundary:


It was pleasing to see that close and inner ring catching had a high catch percentage as we have never tracked these stats before. Infield catching was especially good with 74% held.

Boundary catches were more rare and more likely to be dropped. It's hard to know how much this is an issue because of the small number of chances on the rope. That said, it's worth looking at how we practice based on the information we see.

For the first time we were also able to breakdown catches by player.

15 players had at least one chance. the average chances per season for outfielders (excluding wicketkeepers) was 3.9 (for the two keepers used it was 11.5). The low number of chances, even for regulars shows how important it is to be able to take those chances when they come under pressure!

Individual success varied. Five players held every chance. Another two were above the 70% mark. Four more were above 60%. That's 11 of 15 who met the target for the season. Of course, these percentages are from low numbers, but you work with what you have.

Next year the target will be higher. Nevertheless, these are good signs of improvement. With this information we can tailor training to make sure players get better at holding chances in the right areas and get more over 70%. We can also target the guys who catch less than 60% at the moment and work on improving the numbers of the less effective guys this season.

For example, one player - a good fielder - dropped four from eight chances. Looking at his stats we can see he dropped two caught and bowled while his outfield catching was four from six (67%). We can see he needs more work on catching from his own bowling than catching in his favoured position at point.

One small thing to note here is we changed the way we measured a chance this year, grading them as either standard (G1) or world-class (G2). World-class drops were not counted to encourage players to go for them (and West got 4 absolute worldies this season as a result).

This was slightly different to last year where all drops were counted the same. However, we think this grading system is both fairer and more motivating for players. Even adjusting for last year's method, catches exceeded 60% and so there was improvement.

How did performance change over the season?

Catches and drops: dotted lines are the rolling average.

Catches and drops: dotted lines are the rolling average.

As you can see, catching was a little wobbly at the start, but settled into a much better ratio by the end of the year. We are constantly searching for consistency, but it does stand to reason that catch percentages will improve as volume of practice goes up.

Ground fielding and run outs

The other key indicator of good fielding is ground work: stopping and throwing.

We wanted to measure this to give a benchmark. We had a broad idea from last year (less than five misfields). In 2017 we tracked it in more detail and by fielder as well as by team:

  • Good stops that likely saved runs.
  • Misfields that cost runs.
  • Good throws that lead to a run out or run out appeal (direct hit or assist).
  • Poor throws that we likely to have cost a run out (missing a direct hit or out of reach for an assist).

While there is a lot of interpretation about this, there are also clear moments that can be recorded. So we did.

In terms of raw performance, ground fielding looked like this as a team:

Number of ground fielding chances, split by stops and misfields

Number of ground fielding chances, split by stops and misfields

This chart is totals for the season across all fielding positions. It works out as 3 misfields per match, well below target.

Per player it looked like this:

Percentage of stops to misfields for the 9 fielders with several chances

Percentage of stops to misfields for the 9 fielders with several chances

We can see a sharp variation in the standards by fielders. The best fielder did not make a mistake in five chances, the worst had four misfields in six chances. A tiny dataset, but clearer that the feeling someone is "good" or not.

This allows us to see exactly who is fielding well and give far more specific coaching. So, the player who made three world-class stops but also had four misfields (in 14 chances) would have a different training plan to one who made eight good stops (but no world-class ones) in 10 chances.

We are also able to sift this by position (close, ring, boundary) to see even more granular ground fielding skills on show and further personalise training.

When it comes to run outs, there were very few chances across the season. There were 21 run out chances, nine resulted in either a run out or a close appeal for a run out: A 42% success rate. That is well above the 25% target so very pleasing.

Of course that number can be improved further with practice, but it is well on target and enough to put doubt in the mind of any opposition batsman trying a sharp single: His chances are close to fifty-fifty!

Also, a side point here here is how important focus is on fielding.

The average outfielder averages less than one fielding effort a match (keepers had 1.2). Even the out fielder with the most chances had 1.5 per match.

The opportunity to save runs is small individually but can make a huge difference on a team level (8.6 opportunities to save runs per game, leading to an average runs saved of around 17, enough to win most games.

Which brings us onto our grand fielding unification theory: Fielding Impact.

Fielding Impact

We brought these stats together into one number called Fielding Impact (FI). At a glance, it allows us to see how the team is doing and how individuals compare.

The idea of FI is to put a runs number on fielding.

Every fielding act had an impact on the score: Run out a batsman and you save runs he was likely to get. Drop him and you cost runs. This all feeds into one number.

We had no expectations on what was a good performance in FI, other than it is ideal to be in the positive (saved runs overall rather than cost runs).

On average, West's FI was 5.1 (runs saved per match)

On average opposition teams FI was -2.1 (runs cost per match).

However, the variation was great. West's best FI was 32 and the worst was -32. Opposition scores had simlair wide variance (24 to -28). Off the back of this, one aim may be to work on consistency of fielding. It should really gradually improve through the season as player's practice more. Here is the detailed breakdown by match:

Fielding Impact per match, rolling average is the dotted line.

Fielding Impact per match, rolling average is the dotted line.

Now we have a broad number, it opens up other such as what effect FI has on overall scores. This is hard to measure as fielding is only one part of a bowling performance, but we can look at some raw numbers.

There was no correlation between a better FI and a lower opposition score. Also, if you adjust each game to include the FI in the final scores, no games would have had a reversal in outcome. However, the margin of victory was larger in every case.

Catches may not have won West matches this year, but in closer run games, I can see how a game where 20 or 30 runs are saved will make the difference in 2018. We will see.

We also now know what standard we are at and work on improving team performances by tracking results next year. We can increase the team average FI target and get to work improving it.

The other benefit of FI is to inspire some competion between players. Here is the FI list for the main fielders:


You can see a huge difference in FI between fielders. It seems saving more than 50 runs is a good target, and keeping the number of errors to a minimum is also useful.

The overall FI of a good fielder seems to be more than 10, and this correlates to the guys who are considered the best fielders in the side just by general opinion.

It also seems that the less skilled fielders can probably still shoot for a positive FI, as only four fielders were in the negative.

Speaking of which, two of the fielders at the bottom of the table are generally considered excellent in the field. So, why are they low down and does this show FI up?

I think the system still works because it removes the emotions from fielding. Both numbers 8 and 11 in the list are brilliant; fast, athletic, good hands and strong arms. However, 8 missed two simple run outs and dropped two simple catches. 11 dropped four straight-forward catches so while he barelay made a mistake all year, those catches killed his score. Neither did anything world-class like a diving catch or direct hit run out with one stump to aim at.

Those simple outcomes (what happened, not what looks good) proved that looking good and doing it when it counts are different things.

To prove the point, two fielders who are not considered as good as 8 and 11 finished in the positive. One did not make an error all season.

This lead to the challenge this year of "proving" that FI is a good thing to track for the players. Most like the competition, but some found it easy to say "well, 11 is at the bottom and we all know he is a gun fielder, so that average must be flawed".

In fact, it's important we press home the stat merely reports outcomes in an easy to digest way. So if you see yourself at the bottom of the table, it's not the table at fault, you need to hold more catches and hit the stumps more often!

Like all stats, FI is just a tool by which you can plan tactics and practice, and for that we are very pleased to have it. It will continue in 2018.

Areas of improvement

There is no doubt West improved their fielding in 2017. Even by the simple stat of fewer drops and misfields the difference is clear.

This year we have had much more information to work with to poinpoint how to improve further. It seems we are on the right track, but will look at further improvements:

  • Balancing catching volume to reflect chances that come. More close catching, less (but more intense) boundary catching.
  • Improving concentration and focus skills by training basic skills under fatigue and pressure. Fielders have precious few chances and each error is costly.
  • Giving individual players ways they can improve FI by pinpointing weaker areas to improve and strengths to focus on (for example, a good ground fielder in the ring but poor catching on the rope should spend as much time as possible in their strongest position while also spending some practice time taking high catches under pressure)
  • Working on "worldie" skills that may lead to just one extra chance taken per year. For example, weak side pickup and throwing at one stump.

As always, the focus at West is never on using information to prove someone worthy or unworthy, but as grist for the mill to further development. In the Premier League we will need to make as few errors as possible, so now is the time to start tweaking skills upwards further and make FI even better in 2018.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

In the second part of my review of the 2017 cricket season, batting is examined.

2017 was a dramatic improvement with the bat over the previous year, although there is still some work to do now promotion is secured.

Due to all the extra analysis, the work can be identified very specifically and we can look to add extra dimensions in the knowledge we will be up against stronger bowling attacks next year.

Let's go through it now.

Tactically, the aim was to bat first, build a total we knew we could bowl at and win with the ball. This worked in every game that we reached our goals.

Sadly, on the few occasions West chased, it looked far less convincing, winning two and losing two despite chasing low scores. More on that later.

Setting a target

At the start of the season we identified three scores as targets when batting first:

  • 130: Minimum score that gives at least a 50% chance of winning.
  • 173: Par score, giving an 80% chance of winning
  • As many as possible: No limit once moving past par to prevent a feeling of restriction.

West went about this in a traditional manner, accelerating through the innings. Broadly the aim was to get 35 in the first 10, be on at least 90 by over 30, score 50 between overs 31-40 (predeath) and look to hit out in the last 10 if wickets were in hand. As you can see this worked well:

Average RpO at each 10 over phase

Average RpO at each 10 over phase

Every phase exceeded expectations except the death overs where performance was mixed. That is certainly an area of focus for next year.

The average score batting first was 211.


This was exactly according to plan. The highlights were 347 (admittedly against a very weak side), 260 and 270 against league opposition and 202 against a Premier side in the Scottish Cup. There was also an exceptional rain affected performance, getting 170 in 30 overs which the DLS told us was worth almost 200.

The only real lowlight was struggling to 135 against Heriot's in the Scottish Cup. Even though conditions were difficult and the bowling was exceptional, 173 was still a viable target.

This target setting worked well as a way of focusing the mind for players. It will be repeated next year, but the targets will need to go up as Premier League scores are generally higher.

Chasing Runs

West's chasing skills were less effective in 2017, although this was based on fewer games. If we include a preseason friendly against a local Premier League team, two matches were won and two were lost.

Clearly, it's hard to read much into such a small number of games, but the two losses chasing 166 and 141 are a concern when you consider West blazed past 200 several times batting first, and only got less than 170 once. The highest successful chase was 133.

Why did this happen?

And how can it be prevented?

The plan, as with setting a target, was to score in phases. The first 30 overs can be played exactly the same: Score 35 in the first 10, be at 90 by over 30. West know that 90-5 can reach past 200 if we stay calm and play the game. This happened in the one win, scoring at 32-2 (10) to 125-5 (30) setting up a win on a flat pitch.

In the other games things were not much different:

  • Chasing 166: 33-2 (10), 96-6 (30).
  • Chasing 141: 28-0 (10), 91-6 (30).

So the difference boils down to one or two wickets too many falling in the first 30 overs. The rate was fine (slightly better than strictly needed) but those extra couple of wickets show the difference.

In both those games we were one or two top batsman lighter than usual, but this does expose what happens when no one takes the game by the scruff of the neck as we did in other matches (Kelburne and GHK were examples of a collapse and recovery).

To prevent the chances of this in future, we are going to work on two things. First, make sure that we head into the last 20 overs with five or fewer wickets down. This will help build confidence.

Second - for those times when backs are against the wall - develop a "never say die" approach to chasing runs. West have the ability to keep up with the rate, even when wickets fall. The mentality of "keep going and we will get this" needs to be ingrained even in the face of climbing run rate and falling wickets.

Next year, scores will be higher with 170 the new 130, and 210+ a par score. That can only be done if the mindset is one of determined fight, even when times are tough.

Individual contributions

It's worth examining how these runs were scored both setting and chasing.

West used 18 players with the bat in 2017. 13 faced more than 30 balls to be included as a "regular". 10 of those batted in the top seven which makes them a top order batsman. The others we will call the lower order (not in for their batting specifically).

Notably, one player from this started as a lower order batsman, did well and moved up to the top order, mostly at seven. He spent more games at six or seven than eight so we will count his runs as top order.

The top seven scored 92% of the runs - up from 72% last year - at an average of 24 per game. One batsman passed 400 run, three were in the 300 bracket (I'm counting one who got 290), and two passed 100.

This is a huge improvement on 2016, where the lower order had a much bigger role in recovering the team several times. This year they did not have as much of a chance, but it is a testament to those guys skills that one broke through as a batsman and another still managed to score over 100 runs in seven innings at 19.33.

For the record, that's 10 players breaking the 100 run mark.

We set the target of five more runs per batsman, and it was done. A great team effort.

Strike Rotation

One of the stated targets in 2017 was to improve strike rotation and get more runs from the same number of balls. The simplest measure is Scoring Ball Pecentage (SB%) which is the number of balls a run is scored from.

SB% was up on last year from 32% to 36%.

Breakdown of % of balls scored from

Breakdown of % of balls scored from

Even better, When an innings exceeded 36% SB% the average score rose to 236. When it dropped below the the mean, the score dipped to 196. This is still exceptional but highlights the importance of good strike rotation, and something else that can be maintained in a higher division with hard work in the winter.

For the first time, we also tracked how SB% changed over the innings. As you can see, it also tracked along with RpO:


Naturally, we wanted to see how much of SB% was caused by pure strike rotation skill of the batsman.

First we looked at Balls Rotated (a subset of SB% made up of non-boundary runs scored from shots like pushes, flicks, nudges and drop and runs). The average was 48 balls per innings (18%). This was compared to the oppositions 23 (11%).

Balls rotated per game, with a rolling average

Balls rotated per game, with a rolling average

In above average scores the average BR went up to 66, showing the benefit of rotating the strike on final score.

This was also examined per batsman. Here's how the top batsman did this year at rotating:

Breakdown of rotation, SB% and stolen single averages

Breakdown of rotation, SB% and stolen single averages

You can also see in this table we have tracked "stolen runs". These are the classic drop and run, taking on the arm to get a second or other cheeky runs the opposition are not expecting.

These are the first time we have looked at these numbers, so we did not have any targets, but now we know the benchmarks, we can work to improving all batsmen's ability to turn dots into runs, and push average scores up.

We can also use these stats to show batsmen their style (more rotation or more hit out). From here we can get best practices from those who are better than others at hitting the gaps and running hard. It's a great skill and one that is not often measured and tried to improve.

It looks like SB% can be considered great over 35% and acceptable over 30%. Rotation is fine over 15% and stolen average is OK over 2.00.

Boundary hitting

This year, boundaries became more important. Last year it was all about strike rotation to boost scores, but looking at boundary numbers, it seems they have crept ahead in the priority list slightly.

West hit a boundary every 18.67 balls against seamers and 19.11 balls against spinners.

When the RpO was below the mean, there were an average of 11.33 boundaries (26.46 Balls per Boundary). When RpO was above the mean there were 23.25 boundaries (12.31 BpB). This clearly shows a difference to last year, when boundary numbers hardly changed and strike rotation was the biggest driver in getting higher scores.


Our guess is this is because of more boundary focused batsmen getting more runs this year. Three of the top order are much happier hitting the rope than pinching four singles. The other main batters (including the pro) strike a balance but can all hit a long ball as well as rotate with skill.

BpB and Runs per Scoring Shot give a picture of how much batsmen rely on boundaries to score.

BpB and Runs per Scoring Shot give a picture of how much batsmen rely on boundaries to score.

This was an unexpected but welcome development. A balanced side presents a range of challenges to the fielding team. A couple of boundary hitters cause headlines, meanwhile the strike rotation guys can pick up more runs in the gaps left.

It seems a BpB of 12 or lower is a good target for most batsmen, however if the batsman is a "hitter" that number needs to be lower to account for fewer runs scored with rotation.

Moving forward, we will work on developing boundary options for all batsmen, especially in the death overs where West underperformed: Either more shots for the guys who already do it well, or better execution for the guys who prefer to rotate.

There's always a way if you ask "how do we make 17 BpB this year into 15 next year?" Two extra boundaries is 8-12 more runs and would put West in the top average score for Premier cricket!


Last year we started to look at Control % (C%) for the team as a way of predicting wins.

C% is a judgement on the batsman: did they play a shot under control or not. Beaten on the outside edge or nicking off is not in control, hitting a four over the bowlers head is usually in control! The most useful point was that if the team C% was above 77.7%, West won most games.

This year we expanded the metric to also include individual batsmen and what type of control we saw: on the ground, in the air, beaten and so on. This lead to an overall drop in C% for the team as we could track what was controlled more accurately.

The most notable point from this is that C% and RpO had an almost perfect correlation (batting first):


This is not a huge surprise: The more balls you control, the more likely you are to score runs. However, for it to track quite so closely is interesting. It shows us that luck is not as important as skill (in team run scoring at least).

We also noted that the old rule of 77% did not apply here. Partially because the overall C% dropped as we fine-tuned the metric, but mainly because West won all but one game batting first regardless of control.

C% for the year was 75.54% which did not track closely to wins.

Games were won with C% as low as 71% and lost with as high as 76%. You might think that these numbers depend on conditions, so we looked at comparing C% with the opposition. A higher C% than the opposition did correlate to a higher chance of winning, but it was not a guarantee.

Comparison of C% per game (red bars are lost matches)

Comparison of C% per game (red bars are lost matches)

C% is a good measure of consistency. The smaller the gap between the best and worst, the better the consistency of the team. West saw a difference of 14% between top and bottom C%. Opposition C% varied by 35%. Our sense is, on better wickets in the Premier League, this consistency has every chance to improve (and the opposition's will certainly not be as bad).

C% against different types of bowling is also useful to see how the team did against seam and spin bowling


As you can see, control was different between seam and spin. The ball was left more and the bat was beaten more against seam. The ball was hit more under control against spin but overall control (leaving the ball counts as in control) against both are good: 80.81% and 84.15%

We learned that the overall C% is useful, because it focuses the mind on playing with fewer errors. However, it is not a magic metric that reveals every secret about scoring runs and winning games. It's merely a guide that reveals more about your performed than the runs alone.

C% also allows you to see at a glance how well you are doing during the game.

If you are keeping up with the run rate but at a much lower C% than the opposition, you are still likely to lose unless you get lucky or turn that control around. For this reason, C% is updated live during West games to keep eyes locked on how well the batting is going.

A useful addition this year has been individual control stats for players:


The headline is as you would expect; more control means more runs for individual batsmen. We also found it a motivational metric for batsmen. We can see which batsmen stayed in control and built innings, which ones rode their luck with lower control and more runs, and which batsmen were unlucky, having good control but a lower average.

You can combine this by looking at what kind of control the batsman had. For example, if you are getting beaten a lot more than average and leaving the ball less (as one of the batsman above) you can look at why this is. Perhaps judgement of off stump needs work, for example. It's a strong way to further assess performance.

We are also able to look at C% of different shot types. As with the bowling, we had four shot categories and can see how well the team did:

C% for front and back foot shots

C% for front and back foot shots

SB% for front and back foot: back foot is more productive by a significant amount

SB% for front and back foot: back foot is more productive by a significant amount

Strike Rate (balls per Wicket) of each shot type: back foot play is much safer.

Strike Rate (balls per Wicket) of each shot type: back foot play is much safer.

The only surprise here is how much better West batsmen are off the back foot. With most balls played on the front foot, you might imagine back foot shots might not be as efficient. That was certainly the case with opposition batsmen who were much worse on the back foot. For West, when the ball was shorter, the batsmen played better.

One explanation of this could be the practice nets. They are fast, bouncy and good to practice off the back foot. In the past many have criticised the difference between indoor nets and Scottish wickets, but if the results of years of indoor practice on concrete makes a team of great back foot players then perhaps it's not so bad after all.


Division One opposition top bowlers are generally better than the batsmen, and bowling depth is better too. So, while West bowlers will take the headlines for not dropping a game, the batsmen should take some quiet applause for consistently putting a plan into action in difficult circumstances.

A couple of slip ups aside (and even those where more about wickets falling than intent to score) the batting consistently beat scoring targets, passing 173 seven times from 10 and never scoring less than the minimum aim of 130. In most cases this was done with confidence even in the face of wickets falling.

While chasing was more of a concern, the performances were almost there and with some more work over the winter on chasing, West batsmen will feel confident of going into any match with the skills to take down the best.

It may be a tougher season to be consistent with the bat in 2018 because of better bowling and confidence needing to be built that the team are able to compete, but getting over that hump will see this group of players become formidable in the next few season.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

This is the first in a series looking at the 2017 season for McCrea West of Scotland. This section analyses the bowling performance.

There's no doubt that bowling is West's best skill set. Partially this is due to bowler friendly conditions, but the bowling unit is also well-established and balanced.

Tactically, West built on the good work of last year. The template was to open with real pace, turn to the spinners and bowl opposition out for a below par total. This worked a treat with West's opposition averaging 106 when chasing (143 batting first) and the game finishing inside 32 overs.

This was mainly caused by,

  • A high number of dots: 4.42 Dots per Over (DpO).
  • Fewer errors: 62 fewer wides than the opposition in 2017.
  • Fewer boundary balls: West bowled a boundary ball every 59.84 balls, but hit a boundary every 17.32 balls.

This broke down slightly differently than last year

Fewer wickets fell in the first 10 overs, with an average score of 30-2. This was more than made up for in the following 20 overs, with opposition on 91-7 after 30 overs.

Here is the breakdown of runs and wickets by 10 over phase:

Average RpO for each 10 over stage.

Average RpO for each 10 over stage.

% of balls scored (and dots bowled) by spinners and seamers.

% of balls scored (and dots bowled) by spinners and seamers.

Average wickets falling at each 10 over stage.

Average wickets falling at each 10 over stage.

This was caused by six main bowlers: Four seamers took 67 wickets in 305 overs at 13.12. Two spinners took 40 wickets in 108 overs at 14.03 (under 15 is excellent).

Most wickets were out caught, as you can see below, although not as many as you might imagine. Bowled and LBW combined made up about the same number of dismissals, which reveals West bowlers are very good at sticking to the "bowl at the stumps" tactic:


We will look in more detail at how catches were taken in the fielding analysis.

Innings breakdown

The same two pace bowlers were used up front in the first 10 all season. Their performance last year was stellar, but in 2017 it was a touch more containing than wicket taking. Bowling average was 19.81 in the opening overs, which is higher than hoped because our main strike bowler took fewer wickets (7 at 24.14).

However, the containment stats speak for themselves:

  • 4.58 DpO
  • Opposition Control Percentage (C%) at 62%, with the bat beaten every 4.09 balls.
  • At least two chances created every game (72% taken).

With the aim to have an average below 15, DpO above 4.1 and C% below 71%, it was a start that kept the runs below 30.

Averages for overs 1-10 (DB% = Percentage of Dot Balls, C% = Batting Control Percentage)

Averages for overs 1-10 (DB% = Percentage of Dot Balls, C% = Batting Control Percentage)

This work was followed up in the next 20 overs with some outstanding bowling from a trio of bowlers.

The overseas fast bowler took 18 wickets in this phase averaging just over eight. He was kept honest by the left arm spinner who took 21 wickets at just over nine.

The other main bowler was a nippy medium pacer who had up and down form. However, he caused trouble bowling early (overs 11-20), when he averaged 12 in 21 overs bowled in this phase. His form later in the innings was less convincing, which we put down to losing a bit of confidence after a technical flaw crept in. We will work on this over the winter.

Despite less control over the run rate (RpO crept over 3), creating chances and taking wickets (74% of chances taken) in this phase of the game allowed West to control matches. 

Overall the numbers were impressive, with the most dominant phase between 11-20 overs:

Overs 11-20

  • Average 9.91
  • Strike Rate 21.64
  • RpO 2.75
  • DpO 4.42
  • C% 70%
  • Beat the bat every 6.38 balls.
Averages for overs 11-20 (M1 Phase)

Averages for overs 11-20 (M1 Phase)

Overs 21-30

  • Average 14.50
  • Strike Rate 27.82
  • RpO 3.13
  • DpO 4.26
  • C% 70%
  • Beat the bat every 6.80 balls.

This dominant phase led into the "predeath" overs from 31-40, where West were almost always totally in control of the game by this point.

The dominance of this phase is overblown because so many wickets had usually fallen, but West's bowlers at this point did not release the pressure and the game was often over before the 41st over.

The same bowlers also did damage here, as did a new bowler, a leg spinner, in his first season. He took 9 wickets at an average of 9.22 with C% down at 62%. This was mostly against weaker batsmen, but nevertheless it was an outstanding return (beaten only by the left arm spinner who was even more astonishing, taking 9 wickets at 5.33 in the pre-death).

The leggie also showed he could do it earlier in the piece, taking 7 wickets at 12.14. His RpO was a little high but he also created a lot of chances, as you would expect from an wrist spinner.

At the end, West did not have many death overs to bowl: 35 all season. No one bowled more than 60 balls in the death all year, so it's hard to judge performance. The RpO of well under 5 shows it was a done deal in most games.

Shot analysis

The final element is a breakdown of the types of shots that were played, and what we can learn about West's bowling.

This year, games included analysis of shot type for each bowler in four broad categories: Front and back foot defence, and front and back foot attack. The former is shots like the forward defence, back foot punch and flick off the legs. The latter is drives, cuts, sweeps and pulls.

This was an experiment to see if we could work out what kind of shots were most and least effective against West bowlers. It also shows (roughly) what kind of lengths each bowler bowled.

As you can see in the chart below, the most dismissals came from defensive shots on the front foot. There was a fairly even balance between bowled, caught and LBW. This is interesting because we generally assume catches will always be the largest by some margin, but West bowlers seem to be better at bowling at the stumps on a good length leading to three main dismissals:

Breakdown of what show was played to each dismsissal. 

Breakdown of what show was played to each dismsissal. 

As expected, catches were more dominant in the other shots, especially when batsmen attack. It shows how important it is to bowl at the stumps to almost triple your chances of a wicket.

We can build on this by looking at the Strike Rate of each shot type. Remember the overall SR was 22.76:


The most likely form of dismissal is the back foot attacking shots (BFA), which are mostly played to bad balls (long hops). Bouncers are an exception and, while we did not record the number of bouncers bowled, there were not so many to account for this. 

Individual SR, showing how bowlers differed in type of shot per dismissal.

Individual SR, showing how bowlers differed in type of shot per dismissal.

The lesson here is that a bad ball can get a wicket too, and this season it did it very well! 

A word of caution is that back foot attack shots were West's strength, second only to back foot defence in strike rate (39.80 and 58.50). Perhaps it reflects poorly on opposition batsmen's ability to hit long hops and short balls from the seamers on the ground; certainly an indicator that Premier League teams will not be so willing to waste the chance of a bad ball by getting out.

The SR certainly doesn't stop the opposition scoring from short balls, as the SB% for BFA is 56.44% and for front foot attacking shots (FFA) is 53.65%:


All this leads to an interesting tactical discussion: Clearly pitching the ball up at the stumps gets a lot of wickets at an excellent strike rate around 20. It's also clear that bowling shorter is not as effective for wicket taking when the batter defends. When they attack, a wicket falls every 13 balls! Can this be exploited? We will consider the possibilities over the winter.

Bowling accuracy

It's handy to record bowling accuracy to compare it to the line and length figures we get from PitchVision. However, this was not done directly because I don't trust judgement of length from the edge of the boundary!

We did look at an alternative: counting a good ball as one that resulted in a dot from a FFD. Imperfect as it was, it seemed to be a good rough guide. However, the results it spat out did not correlate to other measures of bowling skill like RpO, SB% and C%, and we could not work out why. We gave up on the idea and instead present an overall set of stats that contribute clues to accuracy based on outcomes:


This season it did not matter much, as even the bottom bowler in the list had a decent season in every category. The top couple of places were interchangeable with four bowlers. Next year we may look at other ways to measure length and line stats. It's important to remember that the outcomes matter most, rather than if you hit your lengths (one tends to lead to the other anyway).

We can be sure of a few things:

  • Bowling a good ball does not automatically result in a favourable outcome.
  • Bowling a bad ball certainly does not result in a bad outcome (and can result in a wicket).
  • Improving these figures by bowling more good deliveries (stock balls and variations) is a solid aim.
  • Tracking accuracy in games - as well as training - makes sense because players are under game pressure and not just running in at nets.

Moving forward

With the ball, the season was so dominant it's hard to find lessons to learn. 

Even against strong opposition, the bowling was superb, never going for more than 179 all year. Even against the might of Heriot's in the cup; West kept them to 3.3 per over and had them 9 down. Against weak opponents, the bowling was incredibly overpowered, bowling teams out for under 100 five times.

That said, West could do better upfront, as the main strike bowler was out of form (by his standards). We have already started the process of getting him back on track for next year. 

The fourth seamer was inconsistent and he needs to work on a technical issue. He needs to improve to become more consistent and find a role in the team. The balance of the side could do with a third spinner who turns the ball in to right hand bats. There are a couple of potential recruitment options in the works there. But that is all still in the air for a while.

We also need to be mindful that overs 30-50 saw no real challenge to the bowlers all year. We can look to focus on bowling under pressure at this stage over the winter.

The realistic challenge over the winter is to impress on the core bowlers the need to maintain and improve good lengths with no loss of focus on pace and rip: They will get away with fewer bad balls.

It's a possible option to look at ways of taking wickets with shorter balls. Bouncers show some potential as the data has show a great strike rate when batsmen go for shorter balls. That is for discussion rather than a sure thing.

Nevertheless, the unit is a great combination of control, raw pace, big ripping spin and good seam movement. As it is right now, I am confident they will win matches next year.

AuthorDavid Hinchliffe
One thing we can’t argue about is this; trying your best always works.

If you put in full effort you will learn something, no matter what the practice. It’s all about your attitude. Go into practice with a focus on something you want to develop then try to develop it. Your efforts might fail, but as we know, failure is an essential part of the learning process. You can’t progress unless you have learned through failure. So get learning and get stuck in.

Ask yourself what the alternative is: To complain will get no nowhere. To put in low effort or leave the session is no help to you. Even your favourite pet practice needs a rest now and again.So, why not get stuck into the practice that is on instead? At least you give yourself a chance for success.
AuthorDavid Hinchliffe

I'm sitting on my sofa on a summer Saturday morning. There's no cricket today because the game was called off last night. This makes West champions of the WDCU Division One by default.

Despite feeling flat about such a rubbish way to win the league, we still won the league, and that's great work. Time for some reflections (even though there is a game to go).

  1. We had a plan this year and stuck to it well: Bat first, score more than 173 then bowl the opposition out for under 130.
  2. When we strayed from this plan, we did much worse, losing games against weaker opposition.
  3. Almost everyone had a good season, the overseas pro is excellent but not streets ahead. One exception was the captain who had a shocker with the bat. 
  4. We had more stat analysis and this seemed to help focus minds, especially in fielding.
  5. Training session quality is still very much dependant on the mindset of the players. I still have work to do to encourage a growth mindset with everyone.
  6. That said, I have also seen some great strides forward in positive, self-sufficiency in players at all levels. No one is "just hitting balls" any more.
  7. Training started well-attended for a couple of months, got sidetracked mid-season by a lot of T20 cricket and has seen patchy attendance in August. I need to work out what to do about that next year. 
  8. This included two of our new coaches who started with gusto and totally stopped coming by the the end of the summer. Coaching is not all glamour! I realise I could have done more to help motivate and inspire then and perhaps they tailed away because I wasn't leading well enough (this was my first year leading a group of coaches). That said, I hope the lads can find a way to stay enthused next season when they are fully qualified. 
  9. Cup cricket is great for team morale.
  10. T20 cricket is a strange creature with weaker sides and rushed or ignored preparations. I need more thought about how we manage it.
  11. We rewrote the dry, rubbish code of conduct and made it more reflective of our aims as a club, especially the first team. I will continue to lead the review of it and keep it relevant, realistic but also aspirational. 

I'll do a longer post on all the analysis and averages later, but it looks good!

The next challenge is the Premier League. I have already started planning what improvements we need to make over the winter to get up to scratch (including recruitment). Again, this will be another post in future.

As we stand - assuming the side is unchanged - I think we would finish mid table with some big scalps but also some heavy defeats. The good news is I think we can thrive in the Prem and develop into a league-challenging side within a couple seasons. It all rests on building a culture where players work hard, stick together and keep developing.

Well played West!


AuthorDavid Hinchliffe